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Although adequate country capacity is considered to be one of the critical missing factors in development 
outcomes, a lack of understanding of how capacity contributes to economic development and of how to 
account for the contribution of capacity development to economic growth remains a challenge. The 
purpose of this paper is to provide an understanding of how capacity strengthening as an input in the 
development process affects economy-wide growth.  
In this paper, we present a stylized model for understanding the relationship between capacity 
strengthening and economic growth in an endogenous growth framework. Endogenous growth theory 
provides a starting point for combining individual, organizational, and enabling environmental issues as 
part of attaining the capacity-strengthening goal. Our results indicate that although donors can play an 
important role in aiding countries to develop their existing capacities or to generate new ones, under 
certain conditions, the potential also exists for uncoordinated and fragmented donor activities to erode 
country capacities. 
From the policy exercises, we demonstrate that improving economy-wide learning 
unambiguously increases the rate of growth of output, technology, capital stock, and capacity. Moreover, 
a donor’s intervention has the maximum impact on the above variables when the economy’s capacity is 
relatively low. In contrast, donor intervention can lead to “crowding-out effects” when the economy’s 
capacity is moderately high. Under such a situation, the economy never reaches a new steady state. Our 
results not only lend support to diminishing returns to aid but also to an S model of development aid and 
country capacity relationship.  
Key words: capacity strengthening, development aid, economic growth, learning 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Although the concept of capacity strengthening has regained renewed interest among international 
development practitioners, adequate national capacity remains a critical factor in the current efforts to 
meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Yet even with increased funding, development efforts 
will not be able to achieve their goals if attaining sustainable capacity is not given greater and more 
careful attention (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2006). The issue is 
increasingly being recognized by both donor organizations and developing countries, as emphasized in 
the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held 
in Accra, Ghana during 2008 (OECD 2006).
1  
Capacity strengthening remains a major challenge for many developing countries. At first, it was 
primarily viewed as a technical assistance process, involving the transfer of knowledge or organizational 
models from north to south (Berg 1993). Technical cooperation and various forms of capacity-
strengthening activities have absorbed substantial funds over many decades. Although a few countries 
have used such funds effectively, donor efforts in many countries have produced little or even negative 
results in terms of sustainable local capacity. This is particularly relevant for many African economies, 
where, after investments of millions of dollars to improve the capacity of African governments, donors 
have begun to question the merits of their policies in building capacity via technical assistance (Fukuda-
Parr 2003). Simultaneously, evidence suggests that development aid is highly uncoordinated and 
fragmented (Dethier 2008). With 56 bilateral donors and more than 230 international organizations, there 
are currently about 60,000 development aid projects. The average number of donors per country almost 
tripled during the past 50 years (from 12 in the 1960s to 33 in recent years). The proliferation of the 
number of donors has created chaos in donor practices and has led to inefficient aid-delivery mechanisms 
(World Bank 2007). In addition, after several decades of economic crises, developing country 
governments have adopted wide-ranging reform programs, often on the advice of multilateral institutions. 
The lack of country capacity to implement these programs, however, has been alluded to as a major factor 
behind the failure of the reform programs (World Bank 2005). Finally, it is now well accepted that 
solutions imposed unilaterally by donor agencies from outside the country cannot address the problems 
and concerns of many developing country governments. Thus, national governments must be willing to 
take “ownership” of their programs and control forces that affect the economy and polity (Wubneh 2003).  
The new consensus, as expressed in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, sees 
capacity strengthening as an endogenous process, strongly led from within a country, with donors playing 
only a supportive role. According to this idea, capacity strengthening involves much more than enhancing 
the skills and knowledge of individuals. Rather, it critically depends on the quality of the organizations in 
which individuals work. In turn, the effectiveness of those organizations is influenced by the “enabling 
environment” in which they are embedded. Capacity, in this view, is not only about skills and procedures, 
but also about incentives, organizational effectiveness, and governance. Yet, it is not clear how combining 
individual skills, organizational restructuring, and an enabling environment could be enhanced through an 
endogenous process. 
Over the past two decades, several studies have used different approaches to examine the role of 
aid effectiveness and its implications on economic growth and other transmission mechanisms (Dethier 
2008). First, macroeconometric studies have attempted to examine the role of development aid on growth 
and structural transformation using cross-country regressions, leading to inconclusive results (Burnside 
and Dollar 2000; Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani 2004; Easterly, Levine, and Roodman 2004; Hansen 
                                                      
1 This declaration rests on five pillars: (1) ownership—developing countries exercise leadership over their development 
policies and plans; (2) alignment—donors base their support on countries’ development strategies and systems; (3) 
harmonization—donors coordinate their activities and minimize the cost of delivering aid; (4) managing for results—donors and 
developing countries orient their activities to achieve the desired results; and (5) mutual accountability—donors and developing 
countries are accountable to each other for progress in managing aid better and in achieving development results.   2
and Tarp 2000; Rajan and Subramanian 2005; Roodman 2007).
2 Second, microeconometric literature 
using both impact evaluation methods and randomized evaluation methods demonstrated whether aid is 
effective (Heckman and Smith 1995; Behrman and Hoddinott 2002; Schultz 2004). The microeconomic 
studies examined the average impact of a policy or program on a group of individuals by comparing them 
with a similar group of individuals who were not exposed to the program (Hoddinott and Skoufias 2004). 
Although randomization is a useful tool for assessing policies and programs, the main problem is 
replication across different settings (Ravallion 2005).  
Despite these soul-searching processes about aid effectiveness and its implications for country 
capacity from both the academic and the donor circles, the severity of the problem persists in many Sub-
Saharan African countries due to a number of contradictions
3 arising out of the behavior of both donors 
and recipients (Berg 2002). First, while more attention has focused on how aid affects economic growth, 
less attention has been paid to the issue of how aid has unintended negative consequences on country 
capacity. Second, technical assistance has been mainly donor driven, without allowing local agencies to 
choose and design projects and programs on their own. Third, although learning is increasingly 
recognized as being central to the development process, knowledge sharing has been virtually absent in 
aid agencies and countries. The major impediments to on-the-job learning among host country officials 
and on overall administrative systems can be attributed to the donor’s narrowly defined project objectives, 
ambitious targets, inadequate understanding of broad policy and sector issues, and poor knowledge of the 
specific country environment (World Bank 1998b). Finally, in regard to ownership and participation, 
serious reforms are required to address the disparity in capacity between donors and recipient countries. 
The change to a more country-owned process is not trivial and requires that the government “owns” its 
strategy and that the donors “own” their independent assessments of the strategy and resulting aid 
allocations, with the two being notionally distinct (Rogerson, Hewitt, and Waldenburg 2004). As 
identified by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) report (2007), the principle of 
country ownership is about genuine collective ownership by society as whole, with political institutions at 
the subnational level (parliaments, civil society organizations, and the wider public) being important 
drivers of change. Genuine ownership requires a legal and institutional framework that ensures poor and 
marginalized sections of the population will be engaged in decision-making processes and can hold their 
governments accountable. However, at times, donors do try to use indigenous monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) systems to monitor performance (e.g., against the MDGs) rather than have wholly independent 
assessments. 
In light of the above, several questions remain: What is the optimal level of country capacity 
strengthening required to achieve specific economic growth targets? What conceptual approaches could 
help us understand the relationship between national capacity and economic growth? Under what 
conditions does donor intervention improve or displace country capacity? Currently, little attention is paid 
to these questions in the economic development literature. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an understanding of how capacity strengthening as an 
input or process affects economywide growth.
4 We present a stylized model for understanding the 
relationship between capacity strengthening and economic growth in an endogenous growth framework. 
The motivation is that the development literature lacks a theoretical framework for addressing capacity 
development issues. Currently, most studies treat human capital as individual skills. At the same time, the 
literature treats the organizational culture, institutional arrangements, and political processes under which 
                                                      
2 The Burnside and Dollar (2000) position is that aid works only when domestic policies and institutions are receptive, 
whereas Hansen and Tarp (2000) have found no relationship between aid and growth. 
3 Van de Walle (1999, pp. 339) noted, “In most countries of the African region, the aid business is typically the second 
biggest employer in the local economy, surpassed only by government.” The contradictions are severe agency problems, such as 
moral hazard, highly asymmetrical power relations between donors and recipients, coordination failures, and inadequate attention 
paid to local circumstances.  
4 We distinguish between capacity strengthening as an input in economic growth outcomes from capacity strengthening as 
the final output / outcome measure of development, restricting our attention only to the former. Although for monitoring and 
evaluation purposes, the latter may be more relevant, we focus on the former so we can better understand the relationship 
between capacity input and economic growth.    3
capacity strengthening operates as exogenous. Endogenous growth theory provides a starting point for 
combining individual skills, organizational effectiveness, and enabling environment issues as part of 
attaining the capacity strengthening goal. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we define capacity 
strengthening and emphasize its importance in development outcomes. We also provide a conceptual 
framework of the capacity-strengthening process and how it affects outcomes, such as higher economic 
growth. In Section 3, we postulate an endogenous growth model to understand how the relationship 
between own-country capacity resources and donor-supported capacity resources affects economic 
growth. We derive the relationship between growth rate of capital accumulation and growth rate of 
capacity, as well as the relationship between growth rate of technology and growth rate of capacity, and 
we examine the conditions under which a steady-state rate of capacity maintains or grows over time. We 
also derive the critical values that own-country capacity resources and donor-supported resources should 
satisfy in order for the steady-state solution to exist. In Section 4, we undertake some comparative static 
exercises and derive some implications of the results. First, the results indicate that an increase in learning 
capabilities of the host country unambiguously increases the rate of growth of output, technology, and 
capacity. Second, a donor’s capacity resources have significant effect on growth in places where the 
elasticity of output with respect to capacity resources is low to begin with. However, if the country’s 
capacity is moderately high to begin with, additional introduction of projects and programs by donors can 
lead to excessive complexity and dual salary structures—undermining country capacity and adversely 
affecting economic growth. Thus, our results not only lend support to the hypothesis of diminishing 
returns to aid but also to an S model of the relationship between development aid and country capacity.   4
2.  MEANING AND SCOPE OF CAPACITY STRENGTHENING:  
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Why Focus on Capacity Strengthening? 
Increased interest in capacity strengthening in recent years is a response to widely acknowledged 
shortcomings in development assistance over the past 50 years. For example, the dominant role of donor-
led development projects with inadequate attention paid to long-term capacity issues is often cited as a 
critical factor in the slow progress (Canadian International Development Agency [CIDA] 2000). The 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness emphasizes the need for significantly enhanced support for 
country efforts to strengthen capacity and improve development outcomes. The declaration calls for 
capacity strengthening to be an explicit objective of national development and poverty reduction 
strategies. In Africa, for example, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) has identified 
capacity constraints as the main obstacle to economic growth and sustainable development. Although a 
quarter of donor aid, or more than US$15 billion a year, has gone into “technical cooperation,”
5 
evaluation results confirm that development of sustainable capacity remains one of the most difficult 
areas of international development practice. Capacity strengthening has also been one of the least-
responsive targets of donor assistance, lagging behind other slow areas such as infrastructure development 
or improving health (OECD 2006).  
The motivation behind this study arises from the contrast between the increasingly recognized 
importance of capacity in development outcomes and the difficulty of achieving it. Several broad 
strategies can be followed, either separately or in combination, to strengthen capacity (Morgan 1998). If a 
simple deficiency in resources is the root cause of weak capacity, then supplying additional financial and 
physical resources will be beneficial. One variant of this method would be to assist in improving 
organizational capabilities so they perform better in terms of obtaining its objectives. This may require 
providing technical assistance or training, assuming the gaps are identified to achieve better performance. 
A related strategy proposes promoting innovations and providing opportunities for learning and 
experimentation. Much of this strategy focuses on the promotion of social capital, including collaboration, 
civic engagement, and loyalty. These approaches aim to encourage individuals and organizations to work 
better together in order to promote a holistic view of development. 
Strengthening the overall organizational system for work synchronization and execution of 
complex tasks can enhance preexisting systems to carry out certain key functions (Morgan 2005). In this 
approach, organizations are seen as processing systems that change individual and system capacities into 
organizational results. This approach seeks to improve an organization’s overall performance by breaking 
down its activities, making recommendations about improvements, and then integrating these 
improvements back into wider organizational performance. The role of institutions is to provide 
knowledge of and access to “the rules of the game,” thus empowering certain actors to create, alter, and 
learn from the processes and rules that govern society. However, equating institution building with public 
sector reforms can be problematic, and reform of entire systems or sectors, such as agriculture, education, 
and health, is important for capacity strengthening (Gunnarson 2001).  
The systems approach focuses more on transformation change and the best ways to achieve it. In 
this approach, capacity arises out of interrelationships and interactions among the system’s various 
elements (Morgan 2005). An all-inclusive strategy for capacity strengthening should be targeted at 
multiple levels and actors, and it should include an attempt to understand the linkages among them. In this 
approach, capacity strengthening is a dynamic process whereby complex networks of actors seek to 
enhance their performance by doing what they do better, both by their own initiatives and through 
                                                      
5 Estimates of donor-assisted capacity development efforts suggest that more than a quarter of total net official development 
assistance is spent on technical cooperation. In 2004, the total amount spent by DAC members on technical cooperation with 
developing countries and multilateral organizations amounted to US$20.8 billion (OECD, DAC, Development Co-operation 
Report, 2006   5
interactions with outsiders (Choritz 2002). From this perspective, capacity strengthening is achieved 
through combining individual and collective abilities into a larger overall systems capacity.  
What is Capacity Strengthening, and Why is it Important for Economic Development? 
There are various definitions of capacity in the literature. For example, Berg (1993) regarded capacity 
strengthening as being characterized by three main activities: skill upgrading, both general and job 
specific; procedural improvements; and organizational strengthening. He concluded that capacity 
strengthening is broader than organizational development, in that it includes all types of skill 
enhancement and procedural reforms, which extend beyond the boundaries of a single organization.  
Grindle and Hilderbrand (1995) argued that both internal and external factors influence the 
capacity of institutions or governments to provide basic services. The internal factors include resources, 
management, information systems, and finance, whereas the external factors relate to policies, 
management practices, and formal and informal relationships. The focus of this definition is more on the 
organizational aspects of capacity.  
According to Morgan (1998), capacity strengthening is a wider and holistic concept, with a close 
relationship between human resource development and capacity development. He contends that for 
capacity strengthening to be effective, it must move beyond administrative techniques so that it can be 
sustainable over a longer period. Thus, capacity strengthening becomes a more complex concept than 
specific capacity inputs. In this definition, capacity strengthening refers to the approaches, strategies, and 
methodologies used by national actors and/or outside interveners to help organizations and systems 
improve their performance. 
In this paper, capacity strengthening is defined as the process of developing human resources, 
creating new forms of organizations and institutions, building innovative networks, and integrating 
country ownership in order to improve the efficiency of the learning activities (i.e., technical, 
organizational, institutional, and policy learning). The efficiency of these learning activities, in turn, 
depends on the economic and political systems, as well as on the social infrastructure and institutions. The 
improvement in learning activities results in better knowledge about policy processes and program 
development, leading to better development outcomes. Our definition is based on two observations: (1) 
Country ownership is critical to development performance, and this applies to both generic capacities 
(such as the ability to plan and manage organizational changes and service improvements) and specific 
capacities in critical fields (such as health or public sector management). (2) Country ownership of 
policies and programs is the means to sustained development effectiveness. Ownership will not begin to 
emerge in the absence of sufficient local capacity (Fukuyama 2004).  
Levels of Analysis  
The concept of capacity strengthening and its effect on development outcomes can be understood by 
examining its four most important components in the context of an enabling political and economic 
environment, as discussed herein. 
Restructuring the Value Systems. Restructuring the value systems refers to reorienting the knowledge of 
the decision makers so that more emphasis is given to scientific analysis and skills. The decision maker’s 
improved knowledge of policies and programs based on strong scientific findings will serve as an 
important conduit for valuable policy decisions (Wubneh 2003).  
This component also emphasizes that country “ownership” needs to be treated as a process. The 
interactions among donors and domestic decision makers can generate either vicious or virtuous cycles of 
change in regard to ownership of capacity-strengthening efforts. A vicious cycle develops when donors 
assume leadership of a country’s policies and programs, perceiving bad results as reflecting weak 
capacity of the recipient country. Under such a situation, the presence of large development aid makes it 
difficult for the host (recipient) government to define national strategies. The local technocrats and 
officials know that what matters is what donors want, and thus the easiest path is to follow the advice of   6
the donors. In addition, higher salaries offered by donor agencies create dual salary structures and 
demoralizes civil services (Berg 2000). Incentives get distorted and performance of organizations in the 
recipient country deteriorates further from a sense of disengagement, resulting in further deterioration of 
country capacity.  
In contrast, a virtuous circle emerges if the donor notices that the recipient is becoming serious in 
developing new programs and taking a lead. By encouraging country assertiveness to turn into a self-
reinforcing process of empowerment, the donor can help in the recipient country’s capacity-strengthening 
initiatives. Over time this can lead to better development outcomes (Kpundeh and Levy 2004).  
Program-based approaches (PBAs) need to incorporate the presence of vicious and virtuous 
cycles in aid delivery and aid relationships (Lavergne and Alba 2003). However, when certain basic 
conditions are met, these approaches can contribute to a process in which policy ownership is 
progressively built, leading to strengthening of country leadership. In contrast, piecemeal donor 
approaches can lead to an erosion of country capacity over time.  
Developing Human Capacity at the Individual Level. Enhancing the supply of professional and 
technical personnel remains a key component in any capacity-strengthening initiative. However, 
focusing only on the spread of education and on the buildup of professional skills and knowledge is 
not sufficient in improving capacity, because overall system capacity constraints may come into play. 
Other important activities of this strategy involve capacity enhancement (absorptive capacity) 
through the transfer of new ideas, techniques, and systems. New investments in training capacity, 
such as promoting national training organizations (both public and private), and in the institutional 
conditions for them to function efficiently can be important in improving performance (OECD 2006).  
Donors can also play an important role in improving country capacity by focusing on demand-
driven approaches that take context into account and that link the focus and design of training to an 
organization’s capacity-strengthening strategies. This focus essentially involves approaching capacity 
strengthening in an integrated manner, with individual skills and the organizational setting being created 
simultaneously in order to improve performance outcomes (Lopes and Theisohn 2003). 
Transforming Institutional Capacity. The major objective of this strategy is in building new institutions 
and restoring existing ones. In the past few decades, inspired by institutional economists, clearer 
distinctions have been made between institutions and organizations. For example, North (1994) defined 
institutions as the “formal and informal rules of the game.” Transforming institutional capacity involves 
changing practices and procedures in order to encourage effective utilization of resources. Because 
institution building involves a variety of goals, they are important to overcoming underdevelopment. One 
of these goals is improving public sector institutions, such as the legal systems, civil services, policy 
regimes, and other rules that govern the interaction between the public and private sector. To improve 
development outcomes, capacity strengthening requires knowledge of the “rules of the game.” For 
example, laws need to be changed to ensure equity among various groups.  
Donors can play an important role in improving development outcomes by emphasizing bottom-
up participatory processes through both social and financial intermediation support organizations that act 
as effective links or bridges between civil society and other institutions, such as government agencies. 
The most prominent category of support organizations during the past two decades is the 
nongovernmental organization (NGO).
6  
The literature has emphasized advantages of improving capacity through local NGOs (Carroll 
1992; Brown and Kalegaonkar 2002). Local NGOs—with their wide gamut of field experience, 
familiarity with local and regional conditions, better understanding of local needs, and knowledge of 
successful, low-cost methods—can improve development effectiveness. These organizations can also 
build on the institutional capacity, because they have ties up and down the ladder of interaction. These 
                                                      
6 International Civil Society Organizations (CSO) Steering Group Paper (2007) position paper for the Accra High Level 
Forum for Aid Effectiveness held in Ghana, September 2008, emphasized the role of civil society organizations in addressing 
ownership, effective aid delivery, tied aid, and conditionality in the aid architecture and aid effectiveness agenda.    7
ties include contacts with grassroot groups at the local level as well as with individuals at the big donor 
agencies. In addition, NGOs play various intermediary roles in their collaboration with local groups. 
Regular upkeep and maintenance, as well as providing an infrastructure for development, can serve as 
capacity-strengthening goals, which are fundamental to developing social capital and relationships among 
international funding agencies, national NGOs, and local organizations.  
Many NGOs have limited expertise, however, especially in financial and management areas. In 
addition, many NGOs work in isolation or with little communication with other NGOs. For development 
processes to work successfully, policymakers and donor groups should work to facilitate their activities 
and nurture their development. Thus, capacity building in NGOs should emphasize both top-down and 
bottom-up efforts. 
Modifying Organizational Structure. The organizational structure of public sector institutions plays a 
critical role in effective capacity-strengthening initiatives. Improving organizational structure 
involves developing a nation’s or institution’s human capacity through better recruitment and 
retention practices, effective utilization of personnel, enhancement of incentive systems, and 
decentralization of the decision-making process.  
The main challenge remains in defining organizational performance. Whereas most official 
programs use measures of performance as proxies for capacities, NGOs have used a “systems” approach 
that avoids objectives at the outset (Watson 2006). In assessing organizational performance of NGOs, 
quantitative indicators need to be supplemented with qualitative assessments in monitoring and evaluating 
performance outcomes. Monitoring capacity development outcomes should be integrated within a 
national monitoring system, even if this entails some form of loss in terms of quality or timeliness (OECD 
2006).  
Figure 1. Capacity building: Conceptual framework 
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The Context of Country’s Economic and Political Environment. In the context of designing effective 
programs, many donor agencies are devoting more time and attention to country political economy 
studies. These studies can improve the operational work undertaken by donors, as it provides sufficient 
details of the political and economic systems, the incentive structure, and the forms of governance in 
developing and transition countries (Department for International Development [DFID] 2003).  
The rationale for understanding a country’s economic and political environment is to think 
systematically about how change occurs, the power relationships among various stakeholders, and the 
structural and institutional factors that are behind the often-observed “lack of political will” in developing 
countries. First, it is important to incorporate a good political-economic environment analysis to 
understand both the legacies of history and tradition and the leadership challenges that those legacies 
pose. For example, formal institutions that are not rooted in local culture generally fail to command 
society’s loyalty or to trigger local ownership (Dia 1996). Second, to the extent that donors are at the 
driver seat in all decision making (leading to weak accountability of the recipient), the current practices of 
aid will also affect the demand for capacity development in the country. Thus, addressing important 
questions such as “What might work here?” can improve development effectiveness implemented by 
donor agencies. An appreciation of the political-economic context may remind us why simple fixes or 
massive injections of aid may have negligible impact on capacity strengthening. The deterioration in 
policy processes and programs can adversely affect an economy’s learning processes / knowledge 
capacity, leading to negative consequences on development outcomes. 
As depicted in Figure 1, priorities given by national governments to policies aiming at human 
resource development, such as creating new forms of organization, building innovative networks, 
developing better institutional structures, as part of country ownership lead to greater capacity and 
improve the learning processes of the various actors. The different kinds of learning, such as technical, 
organizational, and institutional, lead to better policy processes and programs. These programs can take 
various forms,
7 depending on the country context. In any case, active learning through individuals and 
organizations can lead to more efficient learning activities and depends critically on the political-
economic environment and institutions. Thus, improving on development outcomes requires a continuous 
learning economy.  
                                                      
7 Gregersen and Johnson (2001) emphasized that policy learning—such as developing new methods for evaluating the 
outcomes of experiments related to learning effects, developing new forms of democratic participation in the design and 
implementation of design strategies, and establishing new forms of collaboration at the regional and local levels—can form better 
visions about sustainable development.    9
3.  THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
CAPACITY AND GROWTH 
This section presents a theoretical model for understanding the relationship between capacity investments 
and growth outcomes. The model extends the framework developed by Romer (1996) and further 
extended by Chen and Kee (2005).  
For our purposes, let the economy comprise two sectors: a goods-producing sector and a research 
and development (R&D) sector. The former produces conventional output, while the latter produces new 
technology, which adds to the existing level of technology. Four factors of production in the economy—
namely, capital (K), labor (L), human capital (H), and capacity resources (CK)
8—are allocated for use in 
either the goods or the R&D sector. The capacity resources can be conceived of not only as sectoral 
programs allocated by the government for health, water and sanitation, and irrigation development (to 
name a few) but also as improved learning that occurs from interactions among the system of actors 
(firms, organizations, government, consumers, etc.) that influence an economy’s innovation performance. 
Capacity resource devoted to program development is a process through which values and resources are 
authoritatively allocated for the economy as a whole. It is a process whereby a representative government 
puts forward measures to accomplish some desired objectives. This process generally involves 
expenditure of resources—whether in terms of extractive, distributive, or other measures.  
In this paper, we let  
K   denote the fraction of capital stock used in the R&D sector  
H   denote the fraction of human capital used in the R&D sector 
L   denote the fraction of labor used in the R&D sector  
CK   denote the fraction of capacity resources used in the R&D sector 
At this point, it is not important to know how  CK   is allocated (although in a more dynamic 
setting, how  CK   is allocated can have important implications for economic growth).
9 This implies the 
following: 
(1 –  K  ) is the fraction of capital stock used in the goods-producing sector 
(1 –  H  ) is the fraction of human capital used in the goods-producing sector 
(1 –  L  ) is the fraction of labor used in the goods-producing sector  
(1 –  CK  ) is the fraction of capacity resources used in the goods-producing sector 
                                                      
8 Capacity strengthening can also be understood from a production function perspective, in which overall capacity is 
produced as a function of individual, organizational, and enabling environment. Although this approach can provide some 
additional insights into the dynamics of capacity formation, we do not consider this approach in the present paper, as our main 
purpose is to understand how capacity is related to economic growth and under what conditions capacity leads to higher steady-
state growth.  
9 To the best of our knowledge, the literature has not explicitly considered who allocates capacity resources. This person or 
entity can be the social planner or even the donor. Feng, Kugler, and Zak (1999) provided the only model that identifies ways in 
which policymakers can influence the trajectory of their economies. This mechanism works mainly through choices regarding 
family size and investment in children. In this model, developing countries that have high levels of political capacity, that protect 
civil liberties, and that have low levels of political instability are most likely to develop successfully. The political factors 
influence development outcomes through demographic transition to a low birth rate and the incentives to invest in physical 
capital.   10
Technology has the characteristic of being nonrival. Hence, the entire level of technology (A) is 
used in both sectors.  
Output in time t is given by 
 
1 [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] [ (1 ) ] tK t H t C K t t L t YKH C K A L
      
      (1) 
with 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1, 0 < γ < 1, α + β + γ < 1. 
We assume the Cobb-Douglas technology for analytical tractability. The level of innovation in 
the economy depends not only on the amount of capital, labor, and human capital devoted to the R&D 
sector but also on the capacity resources necessary to maintain and upgrade the current level of 
technology.
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The savings rate is exogenous and constant, and depreciation is assumed to be 0 for simplicity. 
This implies that  
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,with n, m ≥ 0  (4) 
The equation for motion of capacity strengthening is given by 
 
.
t tt t CK H CK Y
  , with λ,  > 0  (5) 
The rationale for equation (5) is derived from Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002), in which 
an individual capital investment model is used to study social capital formation. Capacity formation takes 
long periods, with λ denoting the learning aspects of capacity through formal education, job training, and 
nonformal education, while 
11 denotes a parameter that captures how capacity resources devoted by an 
external agent (e.g., a donor agency) are utilized by the host country government for improving country 
capacity over time.
12 We make this crucial distinction between domestic and external capacity resources, 
because capacity strengthening can be understood as individuals, organizations, and institutions trying to 
                                                      
10 For example, if a significant number of scientists and engineers move out of the country for better job prospects, then 
capacity resources invested in the country can erode over time, and the level of innovations may decline.  
11 The implicit assumption made here is that aid is absorbed and spent by the recipient. In this case, the foreign exchange is 
sold by the central bank and absorbed into the economy, and the government spends the associated resources. The challenge 
faced by monetary authorities is to manage the real exchange rate that may result. This assumption is reasonable, unless Dutch 
disease is a major concern or the return to public expenditure is extremely low (Nkusu 2004).  
12 We treat   as exogenous to the host country’s decision to invest in capacity resources. However, in a more realistic 
setting, where the government seeks to maximize a utility function that depends on capital expenditures, the government’s 
recurrent expenditure, tax and nontax revenues, and various kinds of aid (e.g., project aid, program aid from all donors, technical 
assistance, and food aid subject to the government’s budget constraints),   will depend on the above factors and will be 
endogenous (see, e.g., Mavrotas 2003). It will also depend on the country’s balance of payments situation. We assume away such 
complexities from the present model, because our main focus is to understand the relationship between capacity resources and 
economic growth.   11
improve capacity without external intervention. However, under the donor mandate, capacity can also be 
formed over time by utilizing program aid and technical assistance.  
Steady-State Condition for Capital Accumulation 
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Let C1 =  (1 ) (1 )  (1 ) KH C K s
      ; then the growth of capital stock is given by  
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Taking logs on both sides and then differentiating with respect to time, we get  
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At the steady state, 
.
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Equation (8) shows that accounting for capacity as an input into the production function, the 
steady-state rate of capital stock depends not only on the exogenous growth of human capital and labor 
force, but also on the growth rate of capacity resources. Thus, depending on the growth rate of capacity 
(whether it is positive or negative), the steady-state growth rate of the output will also be affected. 
Steady-State Condition for Technological Growth 
To derive the steady-state condition for technological growth (A), let  At g be the growth rate of At. Hence 
.
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For the steady-state condition, we set 
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 (9)   12
From equation (9), it is evident that the growth rate of technology depends on the growth rate of 
capacity. Thus, endogenizing capacity resources have implications for the steady-state rate of growth of 
output. We will need to assume 0 ≤   ≤ 1 for the existence of the steady state. 
Steady-State Condition for Growth Rate of Capacity 
We now look at the steady-state growth rate of capacity from equation (5), as this will be the critical 





. The steady-state condition for the growth rate of capacity must satisfy the following 
equation: 
  ** * 1
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 (10) 
Equation (10) — the critical equation of the model, states that the growth rate of capacity depends 
not only on the growth rate of capital stock and technology, but also on human capital formation and its 
related learning, as given by the first expression on the right side of equation (10). We can thus state the 
first proposition of this model: 
Proposition 1: For the steady-state rate of capacity to maintain or grow over time, there exists a 
*   satisfying (2 –  ) >  , such that if   >  *  , then the economy’s capacity declines, thus affecting 
the economy’s steady-state rate of growth in the long run.  
The intuition of Proposition 1 can be understood in the following context: Suppose the economy’s 
capacity is really low, in that it lacks financial, human capital, and technical resources. In this case, 
donors can play an important role in aiding countries develop their existing capacities by providing aid, 
such as program aid and technical assistance. The host/recipient country can use the aid to invest in 
material resources, infrastructure, and human capital resources, such as education and health services. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that the recipient country has an existing capacity that is moderately high, but 
donors still try to control the projects (more project aid) until completion. As the wages and salaries in 
these projects are paid by donors at much higher rates than what the recipient government can afford, this 
process can possibly lead to “brain drain” away from the public services. If the country is in the midst of a 
prolonged adverse external shock, the recipient country may be forced to reduce its expenditures further. 
The combination of growing costs and diminished budgets can result in a gradual erosion of the recipient 
country’s ability to meet its basic recurrent expenditures. Aid dependence then becomes a strategy for 
donors to keep projects alive so the recipient government’s recurrent costs are sustained. However, 
through the control of projects and programs, the donors erode the country’s capacity even further.  
We next look at the relationships between the growth rate of capital stock and the growth rate of 
capacity and between the growth rate of technology and the growth rate of capacity at the steady state. 
Relationship between the Growth Rate of Capital Accumulation and the Growth Rate of 
Capacity 
We now investigate the relationship between growth rate of capital accumulation and the growth rate of 
capacity in order to understand the dynamics of the growth rate of capital stock. Substituting equation 
(10) into equation (8) and simplifying, we obtain, 
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 (11)     13
Equation (11) shows the relationship between the capacity-strengthening parameters and the 





the steady-state rate of the growth of capital stock will be positively sloped, because we assumed 0 < α < 
1, 0 < β < 1, 0 < γ < 1, α + β + γ < 1. Figure 2 illustrates the phase diagram (linearized around the steady 
state) with the locus of points where 
.
k g = 0.  
To determine the dynamics around the locus 
.
k g = 0, suppose initially that  K g  > 
*
K g . Then from 
equation (7), we see that 
.
k g < 0. This implies that  K g  will decrease until  K g = 
*
K g . Graphically, this 
corresponds to all the points that are above the 
.
k g = 0 locus. Alternatively, if  K g < 
*
K g , then from (7), 
we see that 
.
k g > 0. This implies that  K g  will increase until  K g = 
*
K g . Graphically, this is illustrated by 
all points that are below the 
.
k g = 0 locus.  
Figure 2. Dynamics of the growth rate of capital accumulation 
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 is satisfied, then the 
economy’s steady-state growth rate of capital stock unambiguously increases, improving the economy’s 
growth rate in the long run. 
Proposition 2 states that as long as the elasticity of output with respect to capacity-strengthening 
resources does not come in conflict with the recipient country’s utilization of aid resources,
13 then the rate 
of growth of capital stock will improve in the long run. For example, suppose in the first case that   = 




 = 0.14. In this circumstance, it may be worthwhile for the donor 
to invest heavily in the country’s resources to improve the country’s human and organizational capacity.  
On the other hand, let us consider a second case, in which the elasticity of output with respect to a 




= 0.57. Under 
such a situation, if the donor coordinates its resources so that the projects fit in with the recipient 
country’s policies and objectives, then effective development can be achieved.  
Relationship between the Growth Rate of Technology and the Growth Rate of Capacity 
We now look at the relationship between the growth rate of technology and the growth rate of capacity in 
order to understand the dynamics of the growth rate of technology at the steady state. Substituting 
equation (10) into (9) and simplifying, we obtain 
* (1 )(2 ) (1 )(2 ) ( )
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 (12) 
Equation (12) shows the growth rate of technology in the steady state. It is evident that this rate 
increases in human capital, provided the following necessary conditions hold:   < 1 and (2   ) >  .  
To see the dynamics around the locus of 
.
A g = 0, suppose initially that  A g >  * A g . Then from (9), 
.
A g < 0. This implies that  A g  will decrease until  A g =  * A g . Graphically, this will correspond to all the 
points that are to the right of the 
.
A g = 0 locus, and these points will have a tendency to converge leftward 
to the 
.
A g = 0 locus. Alternatively, if  A g  <  * A g , then again from (9), we see that 
.
A g > 0. This implies 
that  A g  will increase until  A g  = * A g . Graphically, this will correspond to all the points that are to the 
left of the 
.
A g = 0 locus.  
 
                                                      
13 For example, if the recipient government plans to obtain more project aid and food inflows, this can reduce public 
investment and government consumption. If the reduction in public investment outweighs the decline in government 
consumption, growth rates can fall.   15
Figure 3. Phase diagram for the dynamics of the growth rate of knowledge 
 
 
Proposition 3: There exist critical values  *   and  *  such that if 
(1 )(2 )     > (1 ) c     is satisfied, then the economy’s steady-state growth rate of 
technology will improve over time. 
Derivation of the Steady-State Solution 
Summarizing, we have two equations representing steady-state conditions with two unknowns— 
equations (11) and (12). To find the intersection of the two steady-state conditions, we equate (11) and 
(12). After some simplification, we obtain 
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which is simply the condition needed for the economy’s steady-state growth rate of capital stock to 
increase; and (2) 
a(2- - )+c




. Combining these two conditions, the existence of the steady 
state is guaranteed if the following proposition holds: 
Proposition 4: For the steady-state solution to exist, the critical values of   and γ must satisfy the 
following condition: 
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We now examine some possible scenarios. 







, with  < 1 
First, note that the 
.
A g = 0 locus has a negative  K g -axis intercept. From equation (11), it is 
evident that the growth rate of capital stock (
.
k g = 0 locus) will have a negative intercept and a negative 
slope; thus, it lies below the 
.
A g = 0 locus. Figure 4 illustrates the phase diagram that plots the two steady-
state conditions simultaneously in the  K g – gA space. It can be seen that regardless of the initial point of 
the economy, the growth rate of technology continues to increase, whereas the growth rate of capital stock 
continues to decline. The economy does not reach a steady state, because the decline in the growth rate of 
capacity eventually affects the growth of technology and capital stock further. In this situation, there is no 
tendency for the economy to converge to a steady-state solution. This situation may arise when donors do 
not coordinate their activities in the context of a country’s goals and objectives. The proliferation of 
projects and procedures from lack of coordination swamp the country’s capacities and make resource 
management extremely difficult, which adversely affects economic growth. 
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, with either  > 1 or  + > 2  
This is a special version of Case 1 and can be coined as the case of overcapacity. Here, the 
.
A g = 
0 locus exhibits a negative slope. The dynamics are slightly different from Case 1, as both the growth 
rates of technology and of capital stock show steady decline. The loci are constantly diverging, leading to 
no intersection. The consequence is that the economy never reaches a steady state. This situation can 
happen when donors promote so many projects without linkages to the rest of the economy that it erodes 
the government budget even further. The attention of key officials is turned outward (for example, cabinet 
ministers spend a significant time of the year abroad), and the availability of resources for development 
projects depends more on relations with donors than on anything else. The presence of aid dilutes budget 
disciplines, with the consequence that the economy’s capacity is substantially reduced in the long run. 
This case is possibly the most dangerous for the recipient country in terms of new capacity formation, 
where both the growth rate of capital stock and of technology decline further.  
Figure 5. Phase diagram for the dynamics of the growth rate of capital and technology 
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 with either  >1 or ( + ) > 2   18




, with  < 1 
This is the case for a steady-state solution to exist. In this case, the slope of the 
.
k g = 0 locus is 
less steep than that of the 
.
A g = 0 locus, as illustrated in Figure 6. The two steady-state loci intersect at 
point E. Thus, regardless of the economy’s initial point, there is a tendency for the economy to converge 
to point E, implying that E is a steady-state solution for the economy. We conclude that for the existence 





Figure 6. Phase diagram for the dynamics of the growth rate of capital and knowledge 
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4.  POLICY EXERCISES 
In this section, we consider the steady-state effects of three scenarios that could result from different 
development policy interventions. The first exercise
14 examines what happens if the rate of learning from 
human capital accumulation increases exogenously, which could result from a country experiencing an 
increase in the number of new schools or new adult educational programs. In the second exercise, we 
examine the role of the recipient country in asking for more aid from the donor and doubling its 
commitment to invest in capacity resources (  increasing from 0.8 to 1.6), when the elasticity of output 
with respect to capacity is low (we assume   = 0.1). In the final exercise, we consider a similar situation 
of doubling of investment in capacity resources by the recipient country, but with the elasticity of output 
with respect to capacity being high (we assume   = 0.35). We show that the predictions are very 
consistent with our theoretical model. 
Increase in the Rate of Learning in the Economy 
Consider an exogenous increase in the rate of learning (λ) from greater human capital formation in the 
economy. From Figure 7, we find that an increase in λ results in decreasing the intercept of the 
.
A g = 0 
locus; thus, there is a parallel downward shift from 
.
0 (0 ) A g  to
.
1 (0 ) A g  . At the same time, an increase 
in λ results in an upward shift of the
.
0 k g   locus from 
.
0 (0 ) k g   to 
.
1 (0 ) k g  . Thus, the economy 
moves from E
0 to E
`1with the consequence that both the steady-state growth of technology and the growth 
rate of capital also increase, improving the growth rate of capacity. 
The intuition for this result is as follows: First, an increase in learning results in a larger stock of 
human capital in the economy. Assuming that the share of human capital in the R&D sector remains 
unchanged, the increase in human capital resulting from an increase in the growth rate of learning leads to 






1. The larger growth in human capital also 
results in an increase in the amount of resources being used in the conventional goods-producing sector. 
For this sector, the larger growth of the human capital stock that arises from greater learning and from the 
interactions among individuals and organizations, accompanied with more rapid technological growth 
(from the R&D sector), leads to an increase in the growth rate of output. The rate of capital accumulation 
also increases with greater output growth, which leads to a shift of the 
.







Thus, an exogenous increase in learning leads to an increase in the long-term capacity, technology, capital 
stock, and output.  
                                                      
14 Throughout the exercises, we assume the following values of the parameters for the hypothetical economy:  = 0.3;  = 
0.2; γ = 0.1 and 0.35 in the low- and high-capacity levels, respectively;  = 0.8 and 1.6;  = 0.6; a = 0.25; b = 0.3; c = 0.15;   
= 0.05 and 0.2; and d = 0.2.    20
Figure 7. Increase in the rate of learning in the economy 
 
Doubling of Capacity Resources When the Elasticity of Output with Respect to Capacity 
is Low 
In this case, we assume the parameter value (as given by footnote 14) of  = 0.1. We consider the 
following experiment of doubling of capacity resources (i.e., increasing   from 0.8 to 1.6). The capacity 
of the recipient country is low in this situation. As shown in Figure 8, for the same level of α, an increase 
in recipient country resources devoted to capacity leads to greater learning and knowledge interactions 
among agents in the economy, which leads to greater human capital accumulation. The increase in human 
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capital accumulation also leads to greater technology absorption, resulting in resources being efficiently 
used in the goods-producing sector. This shifts the 
.






1. For the same level of 
technology intensity (σ) in the R&D sector, because the domestic level of capacity is low, a significant 
increase in capacity resources also leads to greater human and physical capital accumulation. Thus, the 
slope of the 
.
A g = 0 locus becomes flatter, and the economy slowly converges over time from point E
0 to 
E
1. As a consequence, there is a significant increase in capacity, capital stock, technology, and output. 
Because the recipient country’s capacity is low to begin with, an increase in utilizing capacity resources 
has a substantial effect on all sectors of the economy. The impact can also be understood by considering 
equation (10). Because the elasticity of output with respect to capacity ( ) is extremely low, an increase 
in   leads to greater human capital accumulation, higher growth rates of technology, and a higher rate of 
capital accumulation. All of this contributes to a significant increase in the growth rate of capacity, 
leading to higher economic growth. 
Figure 8. Donor intervention when capacity of the economy is low 
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Donor Intervention when Elasticity of Output with Respect to Capacity is High 
We now consider the final case, in which the elasticity of output with respect to capacity is moderately 
high—that is,  = 0.35. We consider the same experiment as before—of doubling of capacity resources 
by the recipient country’s government (i.e., increasing   from 0.8 to 1.6). Because the economy’s 
capacity is already quite high, the recipient government needs to coordinate the activities in a more 
effective and efficient way, rather than depending on more donor resources. The following is what 
happens in this case: Initially, the economy is at point E
0. Because the economy is already at quite a high 
capacity, an increase in donor intervention without any preplanning and coordination leads to a decline in 
both the human capital stock (possibly through workers and officials moving into the donor-funded 
projects) and the accumulation of technology (possibly because donors have multiple agendas in the 
overall development effectiveness and thus increase the number of projects and programs without due 
consideration to the requirements of the recipient country). This leads to resources being inefficiently 
used, with the consequence that capital stock is depleted significantly, as shown by the 
.
1 (0 ) k g   locus in 
Figure 9.  
At the same time, an increase in donor intervention with multiple projects leads to a decline in the 
technology sector. This can be coined as the crowding-out effect of donors driving the recipient 
government out of projects and programs. Although the decline in the technology sector is not as 
significant as in the commodity sector, it is still negatively sloped and flatter than the 
.
k g = 0 locus. In 
other words, the 
.
A g = 0 locus and the 
.
k g = 0 locus do not intersect, with the consequence that the 
economy never reaches a new steady state. 
Figure 9. Donor intervention when capacity of the economy is high 
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Although this result may initially look odd due to the parametric values chosen in this exercise, a 
careful examination of the aid effectiveness and absorptive capacity literature (Bourguignon and 
Sundberg 2006) can shed some light on why this is occurring. Aid effectiveness and absorption issues are 
two sides of the same coin (Dethier 2008). When aid inflow to the recipient economy is large relative to 
the size of the economy, much of the inflow is spent in the domestic economy in the nontradable sector. 
This can create unsustainability both fiscally and in the balance of payments. To mitigate the potential 
adverse effect of aid inflows, appropriate macroeconomic policies should be used. 
Figure 10. Aid effectiveness and absorptive capacity 
 
Source: Bourguignon and Sundberg (2006) 
In Figure 10, aid effectiveness denotes the total economic and social return to aid at a given point. 
On the vertical axis, the growth rate of GDP is measured, whereas the horizontal axis measures the 
relative volume of aid. The aid effectiveness is the height of the return to aid curve and represents what 
aid can buy for a given level of aid. The curve is concave, showing diminishing returns to additional aid. 
Absorptive capacity sets limits on the productive potential of aid. However, as constraints become 
binding, the unit cost of providing additional public goods and services will increase. At any given level 
of aid, Country 2 is able to utilize aid more effectively than Country 1 due to a combination of 
endowments, institutions, and policies.  
In this framework, capacity is the slope of the return to aid curve. As capacity constraints become 
more binding (e.g., through increase in skilled labor costs or physical infrastructure unable to meet 
demands), the incremental return to aid declines. This can be a point such as B, where a low rate of 
returns to aid is still acceptable, or A, which represents a higher positive marginal rate of return relative to 
some opportunity costs of funds. For countries with lower overall aid effectiveness, such as Country 1, 
the total returns to aid will be lower, but the absorptive capacity (the marginal return for a given aid-to-
GDP ratio as given by the slope of the curve) may be higher or lower than in Country 2. Thus, aid   24
effectiveness and absorptive capacity are dynamic processes that are linked to the underlying forces of 
economic development.
15 
In Figure 9, the macroeconomic constraints of the recipient country adversely affect aid inflows. 
Because the economy already has a moderate level of absorptive capacity, too much aid inflow can distort 
domestic prices in favor of nontradable goods. This reduces the purchasing power of aid in terms of 
domestic goods and services and crowds out domestic public investment. Increasing the volume of aid 
can also lower the competitiveness of the economy and foreign markets through a real exchange rate 
appreciation. Although the central banks can try to mitigate these effects, the capacity of the host 
economy can only improve after a lag.  
Implications for Donor Agencies 
As pointed out by Doucouliagos and Paldam (2007), the impact of development aid on growth shows a 
positive but insignificant effect, while studies of the effect on growth that is conditional on either good 
policy or development aid itself have shown weak results. For example, the World Bank (2005) noted that 
“aid is more effective in fostering growth and improving service delivery in countries with better policies 
and institutions. It is also more effective when it is aligned with recipients’ priorities, when it reduces 
transaction costs through harmonized and coordinated donor processes, when it is predictable, and when 
there is a clear focus on results.”  
Our result blends the above findings and indirectly implies that development aid should be 
conditional on a country’s level of capacity for it to be more effective. Under this framework, a country’s 
level of capacity should be the primary criterion for eligibility for substantial aid. We thus propose an S 
model of aid effectiveness on the lines of Abegaz (2005), where country ownership and need (high 
poverty rates) determine the level of development aid (as depicted in Figure 11). 














                                                      
15 Another possible theoretical rationale for this result may be explained by the aid Laffer curve argument (van de Walle and 
Johnston 1996; Lensink and White 1999). According to this argument, although there is a limit to the absorptive capacity of aid, 
the situation is made worse as resources are diverted to manage the growing aid program, with returns to aid eventually becoming 
negative. 
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The first segment of Figure 11 covers the pre-reform stage, where country ownership is really low 
and the state itself may be failing. The level of human resources at this stage is very low (in part because a 
significant portion of the population is illiterate or barely has a primary education), institutions may be 
failing, and there are virtually no public or private sector organizations. Under these conditions, the 
recipient country would first need to develop its own strategy, programs, and projects in consultation with 
both its own constituencies and donor agencies. It would then present its plans to the donors, who would 
put unrestricted and untied financing into a common pool. The level of aid would be low at this stage and 
would come mainly in the form of technical assistance, policy advice, or grants (Devarajan, Dollar, and 
Holmgren 2001). Donors should support the efforts of the recipient countries and actively support 
reformers and visionary leaders. 
The first-stage reforms should consist of human resource development (not only greater primary 
school enrollment, but also higher levels of secondary and tertiary enrollment strategies), accompanied 
with better public sector management. These reforms are important, as the recipient country’s monetary 
need is high, and aid effectiveness is increasing. Improved knowledge exchange of better development 
practices between the donor and the recipient countries can also improve learning among officials in the 
recipient countries. This learning can be conducive to raising productivity in the public sector. This 
situation is demonstrated in Figure 8, in which development aid has high and positive marginal returns. 
Both the donor’s and the country’s own resources can be allocated to high-priority areas to generate 
higher economic growth and development effectiveness. 
The second-stage reforms should emphasize building new institutions and restoring existing ones. 
At this stage, aid intensity needs to be maintained or even increased, as the effectiveness is very high 
(although monetary needs are not as much as in the first stage). In addition, donors can improve on 
development outcomes by creating effective links between civil society organizations (such as NGOs) 
and other partners. Because these civil society organizations have links both up and down the ladder of 
interaction, the country’s effective capacity can be strengthened. Donors can provide their expertise on 
public sector management to NGOs in order to facilitate activities and improve upon development 
effectiveness.  
The final stage (the post-reform period) occurs when a country owns its policies and programs. 
This stage is demonstrated in Figure 9, in which diminishing marginal returns to aid set in and other 
sources of investment become the dominant form of financing. Because this stage is characterized by an 
improved organizational structure of public sector institutions, a strong supply of professional and 
technical personnel, and the presence of strong institutions, donors are better off by letting recipient 
countries own their own policies and programs. At this stage, donors should develop exit strategies to 
minimize the disruptions of transition and to smooth the way for new capacity-building initiatives. 
There will be substantial revamping of the international aid architecture under the above 
arrangements. Donor agencies (both bilateral and multilateral) will still play a critical role, but their 
ownership of policies and the programs of recipient countries will be substantially diminished. Donors 
will learn from their past mistakes and change their ways of managing aid and improving country 
ownership of policies and programs. They may help organize knowledge management, assist in operation 
of public sector organizations, and support civil society organizations for improved reforms in judiciary 
and legal systems. Although development aid can be justified during the first and second stages of reform 
for improving country capacity, less aid will be necessary in future stages. The interaction between 
development aid and learning by recipient countries is important and should be cultivated in a manner that 
promotes country and institutional capacity building instead of the capacity erosion that is evident in 
many sub-Saharan African countries at present.     26
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The endogenous growth models, as formalized by Romer (1986, 1990) and Rebelo (1991), were 
revolutionary in the economic sciences. The main prediction from these models was that the long-run 
growth rate of an economy was proportional to the level of resources devoted to R&D, such as the stock 
of human capital. However, these models did not incorporate capacity as a resource in the production 
process.  
Resources devoted to capacity strengthening remain a major challenge in many developing 
countries, and accounting for them can provide some additional important insights about development 
processes. This is important because excessive donor interventions in multifarious projects and programs 
have often been in direct conflict with recipient country policies and objectives. As pointed out by Dollar 
and Svensson (2000), donor financing with strong conditionality but without strong country ownership 
and political support has not produced sustainable impact.  
The novelty of this paper is to consider capacity not only as a resource that is used to produce 
goods and services and to generate new technologies, but also to emphasize its role in improving 
economywide learning outcomes, which eventually influences the innovation performance of an 
economy. Although the literature has strongly emphasized how capacity is formed, a theoretical 
perspective of its role in development outcomes has not yet been demonstrated. We consider capacity to 
be an endogenous process that is not only generated by country governments, but also strongly related to 
learning. We show that in the steady state, the growth rate of capacity is critically dependent on the 
learning parameter, the elasticity of output with respect to capacity resources, and how the resources are 
utilized by the recipient country with the help of donor funds. 
We demonstrate that for the recipient country’s capacity to be maintained over time, there exists a 
critical value of utilized resources from donor funds that needs to be devoted for capacity strengthening. 
However, if the actual value exceeds this critical value, the country’s capacity will decline over time, 
affecting the long-run growth rate of the economy. 
Undertaking some of the policy exercises, we first found that increasing learning capabilities in 
an economy raises the human capital stock and unambiguously increases the rates of growth of output, 
technology, capital stock, and capacity. Second, a donor’s intervention is most desirable when country 
capacity is low. In this case, an increase in resources utilized efficiently by the recipient country has 
substantial effects on the growth rate of output, technology, and capacity.  
Finally, if the country’s domestic capacity is moderately high (elasticity of output with respect to 
capacity resources), excessive donor intervention can actually lead to crowding-out effects, in which the 
economy never reaches a new steady state. The consequence is that the rate of growth of technology, 
output, and capacity will continuously decline. Under such situations, donor projects will only be relevant 
if they fit into the recipient countries’ policies and objectives.  
Our results have indirect implications for donor agencies—based on the level and stage of a 
country’s ownership of policies and programs. During the pre-reform stage, when the level of ownership 
of policies and programs is very low, the level of aid should be low and should come mainly in the form 
of technical assistance, grants, or policy advice. During the first and second stages of reform, aid should 
increase to address human resource development, better public sector and organizational management, 
and enhancement of the institutional capacity of the recipient country. However, during the post-reform 
period, the need for development aid diminishes substantially. Donors are better off developing an exit 
strategy to let recipient countries own their policies and programs.  
The limitation of this paper is that we do not consider how capacity is formed, maintained, and 
sustained over time through the interactions of various stakeholders. This can have important implications 
on the dynamics of capital accumulation and rate of growth of technology. We also have not considered 
capacity formation from a production function perspective, in which overall capacity is produced as a 
function of individual, organizational, and enabling environment. In the future, we will undertake such 
approaches to capacity development.   27
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1 






, then the steady-state rate of growth of 
capacity will fall over time. In other words, 
*
CK g < 0.  





(2 )   , the steady-state rate of growth of capital stock declines. We now show that this condition is also 
sufficient for the growth rate of capacity to decline.  






, we have the denominator of the right side of the 










, then the denominator of 
the right side of the expression must become negative, showing that growth rate of capacity also declines.  
Differentiability of 
*
CK g  Assumption 
Let us assume that the  CK g  function in equation (10) is continuously differentiable in   and  . In other 
words, we rule out extreme possibilities, such as ( + ) = 2, and similar values of the above parameters. 
From equation (10),  CK g  is concave in  and  .
16 Thus, there exists a global optimum. We therefore 
need to show that the Jacobian consisting of the second-order differentials is negative semidefinite.  
Let (2 )      and  
** () ( 1 ) ( ) kA mg gn A          . The elements of 

































Proof of Proposition 2 
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16 This is fairly straightforward to show and can be obtained from the authors upon request.    28
After further simplification, we get  
    
* * (1 )(2 ) (2 ) (1 )(2 ) ( ) K A g mg n                    
Thus, the slope of the steady-state rate of growth of capital stock hinges on the expression 





Proof of Proposition 3 
Substituting equation (10) into (9) and simplifying, we obtain 
   

* *( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 )
                                                                     + (1 )(2 ) ( )
                                                               
AK gc g a c
mb c
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   
      (1 ) (2 ) nc d         
 
We know from Proposition 1 that the expression (2 – Φ – γ) > 0. By assumption,  1    . 
Hence, for the existence of the steady state, we must have   ≤ 1 for the expression on the right side of 
this equation to be positive. For stability, however, we must have the expression in parentheses on the left 
be positive; thus,   and   must satisfy the condition as given by Proposition 3 (QED). 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Looking at the expression in the parentheses on the left side of equation (13), we know from Proposition 
1 that (2 – Φ – γ) > 0 for the steady-state rate of capacity to maintain or grow over time. We also know 
that for the solution to be stable, we require σ < 1.  




, which is the condition for the economy’s 
steady-state growth rate of capital stock to increase and for the existence of a solution. Thus, all we need 




, which is simply the condition for the economy’s steady-state growth 
rate of capital stock to increase and for an intersection of the growth rate of capital stock and the growth 
rate of technology. We need to show the following:  
(1 ) c    > (2 )(1 )[ (2 ) ] ac            
After some simplification, we have c > (2 )   [ (2 ) ac     ]. However, from Proposition 
2, because (2 )   (1 )   >  , we have c (1 )(2 )      > (2 )   [ (2 ) ac     ]. Thus, we obtain,  









, and the 
statement follows (QED).    29
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